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violation of his legal right by the statute or order which is 
attacked. (Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 [42 Sup. 
Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078] ; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 
U. S. 464 [58 Sup. Ct. 300, 82 L. Ed. 374].) 
For example, in Wallace v. Ganley, 95 Fed. (2d) 364, a 
group of producers sought to enjoin the enforcement of an 
order regulating milk which was issued by the Secretary 
of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act as 
amended in 1935, supra. The order fixed minimum prices 
to be paid to the producers by the handlers. The producers 
attacked both the constitutionality of the statute and the 
validity of the order. It was held that the producers had 
no standing to maintain the suit as they were unable to show 
any wrongful act which directly resulted in a violation of 
their legal rights. So here, although the growers may be 
a ble to show certain damage arising from the restrictions 
imposed upon shippers by the order, they have suffered no 
legal wrong for the order does not directly affect them in 
its regulation. Consequently, they are in no position to 
challenge its validity. 
Let a writ of prohibition issue as prayed for by the pe-
titioners. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Traynor, J., con-
curred. Carter, J., concurred in the conclusion. 
[L. A. No. 17952. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1941.] 
MARY E.HALL, Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 
(a Municipal Corporation), Respond'ent. 
[1] Municipal Corporations - Claims - Demand - Sufficiency -
Specification of Place of Accident.-There must be a substan-
tial compliance with the act relating to claims against munici-
palities (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 5149), before an action for damages for injuries resulting 
from a defective sidewalk or street can be maintained. There 
[1] See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 638; 19 R. C. L. 1040. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 453 (3); 
[2] Municipal Corporations, § 453; [3,4] Municipal Corporations, 
§469. 
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is no such compliance where a claim filed does not specify the 
place of the accident. 
[2] Id.-Claims-Demand-Waiver of Defects.-Since a city is 
powerless to waive compliance with the requirements of the 
act relating to claims against cities (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; 
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5149), respecting the filing of a 
verified claim for damages resulting from a dangerous or de-
fective condition of any pUblic streets, etc., actual knowledge 
of the city officials of the facts required to be stated in such 
a claim does not dispense with the filing of a· proper claim. I 
[3] Id.-Actions-Pleading-Insufficiency of Claim.-A city sued 
for personal injuries sustained through a fall upon a side-
walk is not precluded from relying on the defense of the 
insufficiency of the claim filed because of its failU:re specially 
to plead such defense in its answer, where the sufficiency of 
the claim is placed in issue by a denial of the allegation of 
the filing of a claim. 
[4] Id.-Actions-Evidence-Burden of Proof-Filing of Claim. 
A plaintiff suing a city for damages for personal injuries al-
legedly sustained through a fall upon a sidewalk has the bur-
den of proving compliance with the act relating to claims 
against cities (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 5149), respecting the filing of a claim with the city; and 
where he fails to sustain such burden, a judgment of dismissal 
is properly entered. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles Gounty~. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed. 
Porter C. Blackburn for Appellant. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schradel', 
Assistant City Attorney, and Norman Brand, Louis A. Babior 
and Victor P. Spero, Deputies City Attorney, for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-A petition for hearing in this ease was 
granted to the end that further consideration be given to 
the contentions of the appellant. On such consideration we 
agree with the disposition of the appeal by the District Court 
of Appeal of the Second Appellate District and adopt as 
the opinion of this court the opinion of that court prepared 
by Justice [W. J.] Wood with the modifications that herein-
after appear: 
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"Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of dismissal en-
tered in her action to recover damages for personal injur~c~l 
alleged to have resulted from the defective condition of a 
sidewalk under the control of the defendant city. 
"Plaintiff suffered her injuries on September 14, 1938, 
when she slipped on some mud or other slippery substance 
which was covered with leaves or debris. She seeks to re-
cover damages under the provisions of the Public Liability Act 
of 1923. (Stats.1923, p. 675; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619.) 
The complaint contains the allegations usual in such actions 
and in particular it is alleged that the accident occurred on the 
sidewalk at the corner of Union Drive and Sixth Street in 
the City of Los Angeles and that plaintiff had regularly filed 
her claim for damages with the defendant city. In its an-
swer defendant denies all of the material allegations of the 
complaint. Upon the issue as to the regularity of the claim 
filed with defendant plaintiff proved that on November 9, 
1938, the following verified claim for damages was filed with 
defendant: 'To Mrs. Mary E. Hall, Address c/o Porter C. 
Blackburn, 1314 Washington Bldg., Los Angeles. Sept. 14, 
1938. Personal injuries received from slipping on sidewalk 
which was covered with mud, leaves and debris, resulting in 
injury and fracture to spinal column: Damages: Medical ex-
penses $500; permanent injury $5000; loss of earnings $2500-
$8000.00. ' 
"Defendant objected to the introduction of any further 
evidence on behalf of plaintiff on the ground that the fore-
going claim failed to state the place where the accident hap-
pened and therefore did not comply with the provisions of 
the 1931 statute (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act 5149) relating to claims for personal injuries against mu-
nicipalities. Prior to a ruling by the court on such objection 
plaintiff offered in evidence the following letter which she had 
received from the city clerk of defendant city about two weeks 
before the present action was commenced: 'Greetings: At 
the meeting of the Council held this day, the following report 
of the Finance Committee, was adopted: "In the matter of the 
claim of Mary E. Hall, in the amount of $8,000.00, for damages 
because of personal injuries alleged to have been received 
when she slipped on a muddy sidewalk at the corner of Union 
Drive and Sixth Street, on September 14, 1938: The City 
Attorney reports that after making a complete investigation 
Dec. 1941.] HALL v. CITY OF Los ANGE!tE!S. 
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of this matter, he is of the opinion that there is no municipal 
liability involved, and recommends that the claim he denied. 
We recommend,' in view of the City Attorney's report, that 
said claim be denied and the matter filed.'" The Court sus-
tained defendant's objection and thereafter '_entered the 
judgment of dismissal from which the appeal is taken. 
[1] "We are called upon to decide whether or not the 
claim filed by plaintiff sufficiently complies with the provi-
sions of Deering's General Laws, Act 5149, to enable her to 
maintain this action. Section 1 of this act provides: 'When-
ever it is claimed that any person has been injured or any 
property damaged as a result of the dangerous f5p defective 
condition of any public street, highway, building, park, 
grounds, wor ks or property, a verified . claim for damages 
shall be presented in writing and filed with the clerk or sec-
retary of the legislative body of the municipality, county, 
city and county, or school district, as the case may be, within 
ninety days after such accident has occurred. Such claim 
shall specify the name and address of the claimant, the date 
and place of the accident and the extent of the injuries or 
damages received.' Defendant contends that the failure of 
plaintiff to specify the place of the accident in the claim is 
fatal to iter right to maintain the present action. 
"Compliance with the statute referred to is mandatory and 
there must be at least a substantial compliance with its pro-
visions before a suit for damages for personal injuries result-
ing from a defective sidewalk or street may be maintained 
against the City. (Cooper v. County Of Butte, 17 Cal. App. 
(2d) 43 [61 Pac. (2d) 516]; Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. & S. 
ll. Ry. Co., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 215 [82 Pac. (2d) 216].) 
"It is contended by plaintiff that the notice in question 
substantially complied with the requirements of the act and 
that since the city officials actually investigated and dis-
covered the place where the accident occurred, tn.e city was 
not misled by her failure to designate the place of the acci-
dent in the claim. In support of this proposition plaintiff 
relies principally upon Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. & S. ll. By. 
Co., supra, and Kelso v. Board of Educa.tion, 42 Cal. App. 
(2d) 415 [109 Pac. (2d) 29]. In the Sandstoe case this 
court. held that a claim (apparently complete and regular 
on its face) which was filed in duplicate with the city con-
o. . 
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troller and the city clerk at the same time substantially com-
plied with the requirement of the city charter that the claim 
must be filed with the legislative body within 30 days after 
rejection by the city controller. The claim under considera-
tion in the Kelso case met the statutory requirements in all 
respects except that it was verified by plaintiff's father in-
stead of by the minor plaintiff and it was held that a sub-
stantial compliance with the requirements of the statute had 
been made." In each of these cases there was compliance with all of 
the requirements enumerated by the statute, but the manner 
Qf complying with one of them was derective. The courts 
held that a defect in the form of compliance is not ratal so 
long as there is substantial compliance with the essentials of 
the requirement. In the present case, however, there is an ~ntire failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with one ~f the mandates of the statute. Substantial compliance can-
I'lot be predicated upon no compliance. A contrary holding 
would permit a claimant to bring suit against a city on the 
basis of a claim that included none of the information re-
quired by the statute if he offered to show that the city ac-
quired the information independently of the claim. Such 
a holding would emasculate the statute. 
The present case is governed not by the doctrine of sub-
stantial compliance but "by the principles enunciated in 
Oooper v. County of Butte, supra, and Sperwer v. City of 
Calipatria,9 Cal. App. (2d) 267 (49 Pac. (2d) 3201· In each 
of these cases it was held that the filing of an unverified claim 
is not a substantial compliance with the requirements of the 
statute. The failure to state the place of the accident is as 
serious a defect as is the failure to verify the claim. Indeed 
no part of the claim can be of more importance to the city 
officials than that part which gives them information to en-
able them to locate the point where the alleged accident oc-
curred and to make proper investigation of the condition of 
the pI"emises. In a number of jurisdictions it has been held 
that a claim is fatally defective if it fails to designate the pla~e of the accident in such manner as to enable the officials 
to locate it. (Atkinson v. City of Indianapolis, 101 Ind. App. 
620 [192 N. E. 1571 ; Cronin v. City of Boston, 135 Mass. 
110; Village of Dawson v. Estrop, 243 Ill. App. 552; Benson 
v. City of Madison, 101 Wis. 312 [77 N. W. 1611 ; Reichert 
Dec. 1941.] HALL V. CITY 0]' Los ANGELES. 
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v. City of Chicago, 169 Ill. App. 493, and Purdy v. Oity of 
New York, 193 N. Y. 521 [86 N. E. 561].) We must there-
fore hold that .the entire failure to designate in the claim 
the place where the accident occurred constituted such a fail-
ure to comply with the statutory requirements as to pre-
clude plaintiff from maintaining the present action. 
[2] "Plaintiff's contention that defendant by investig-at-
ing and rejecting the claim waived any defects therein can-
not be sustained. In the Spencer case, supra, an unverified 
claim was filed with the city and after investigation the city 
made an offer of compromise which plaintiff rejected. At 
no time did the city object to the defective form of plaintiff's 
claim. In holding that the city was not estopped to assert 
the defense of failure to comply with the statutory require-
ments relative to the claim the court observed that the city 
was powerless to waive compliance with the statutory provi-
sions. The holding of the Spencer case was expressly ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Douglass v. Oity of Los 
.Angeles,5 Cal. (2d) 123 [53 Pac. (2d) 353], and was declared 
to be the law in all cases coming within its purview. Since 
the city is powerless to waive a compliance with the statute, 
actual know ledge on the part of the city officials of the facts 
required to be stated in the claim does not dispense with the 
filing of a proper claim. (Kline v. San Francisco Unified 
School Dist'rict, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 174 [104 Pac. (2d) 661] u) 
[3] "Plaintiff's final contention is t'hat defendant is 
estopped to raise the defense of the insufficiency of the claim 
because of its failure to specially plead such defense in :,the 
answer. This proposition must be rejected for the question 
as to the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim was placed in issue. 
by defendant's general denial of plaintiff's allegation that 
she had filed her claim with the city. [4] Since the statu-
tory requirements are mandatory and compliance therewitn 
is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a suit for the dam-
ages claimed (Cooper v. County of Butte, supra, and Sand-
stoe v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry. Co., supra), the burden o,f 
proof of such compliance was on plaintiff. Since plaintiff 
failed to sustain this burden the court properly entered the 
judgment of dismissaL" 
The judgment is affirmed.. 
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CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion is contrary to every concept of fair-
ness and good faith. If a similar situation were presented in 
which an individual or private entity rather than a municipal 
corporation were involved it would be unhesitatingly held that 
there had been a substantial compliance, or that the defend-
ant was estopped to assert the insufficiency of the claim, or 
that there was a waiver of the alleged defect therein. Surely 
a government agency should be at least as much bound, if 
not more, than an individual by the requirements of equity, 
justice and fair dealing. Indeed, such agency should be 'held 
to a higher standard of fairness as a matter of example for 
others. When this case was before the District Court of 
Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, Mr. Jus-
tice McComb of that court wrote a very able dissenting 
opinion which I am adopting as a part of my dissenting 
opinion in this case. He said: 
"There are two rules supported by respectable authority 
which in my view are controlling in the present case. 
I' First: Substantial compliance with t'he requirements of 
section 1 of Act 5149, Deering's General Laws, 1931, is 
sufficient to permit an injured person to maintain an action 
against a municipality. (Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 
Cal. App. (2d) 415, 422 [109 Pac. (2d) 29]; Sandstoe v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 00., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 215, 220 
[82 Pac. (2d) 216].) 
"Second: When a claim has been filed with a municipality, 
full investigation made thereof and the claim rejected for 
some reason not connected with the form of notice or its con-
tents, the notice has performed its function and defects 
therein can no longer be relied upon to prevent a recovery. 
(Bowles v. Oity of Richmond, 147 Va. 720 [129 S. E. 489, 
133 S. E. 593, 595] ; Bowman v. Ogden Oity, 33 Utah 196 
[93 Pac. 561, 564] ; Nevala v. Oity of Ironwood, 232 Mieh. 
316 [205 N. W. 93, 94, 50 A. L. R. 1189] ; Greenberg v. City 
of ~T aterbury, 117 Conn. 67 [167 Atl. 83, 84] ; Lindley v. 
Oity of Detroit, 138 Mich. 8 [90 N. W. 665] ; Hunter v. Vil-
lage of Durand, 137 Mich. 53 [100 N. W. 191, 192].) 
"Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the present 
case, we find, as stated by this court in Sandstoe v. Atchison, 
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., supra, at page 223, that 'the purpose of 
filing a claim against the city is to enable city officials to make 
Dec. 1941.] HALL V. CITY OF Los ANGELES. 
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proper investigation concerning the merits of the claim and 
to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit if settlement 
should be shown to be proper.' That such is the purpose 
underlying the requirement is clear. (Uttley v. Oity of Santa 
Ana, 136 Cal. App. 23 [28 Pac. (2d) 377]; Wagner v. City 
of Seattle, 84 Wash. 275 [146 Pac. 621, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 
720] .) 
"From the statements contained in the letter in the pres-
ent case from respondent's clerk notifying plaintiff of de-
nial of her claim, it is apparent that respondent was not mis-
led by failure of the claim to specify the place where the 
accident took' place. The letter describes the precise place 
where the accident occurred and· refers to a 'complete inves-
tigation' of the matter by the city attorney. The purpose 
of the statute in requiring the filing of a claim was therefore 
in fact accomplished, although the claim itself was defective. 
There is no evidence of any intention on the part of plaintiff 
to . mislead defendant by filing a defective claim. So far as 
the record discloses, plaintiff filed such a claim in a bona fide 
attempt to comply with the statutory requirements. Under 
such circumstances where, as here, there is no evidence that 
such clajm did in fact mislead the municipality, it will be 
deemed sufficient to enable plaintiff to maintain an action 
against the city following the rejection of such claim. 
(Kelso v. Board of Education, supra; Sandstoe v. Atchison, 
T. & S. F. Ry. 00., sup'ra.) 
"The principle underlying the rule is well stated in Decker 
v. Oity of Seattle, 80 Wash. 137 [141 Pac. 338, at page 339], 
where it is said (quoting from Hammock v. Tacoma, 40 Wash. 
539 [82 Pa~ 893]): 
'" ~ .. where there has been a bona fide effort to comply 
with the statute, and t'here has been no intention to mislead, 
it is a sound and just rule which opens the door of the court 
to an inquiry whether the notice did in fact mislead. If it 
did not in fact mislead, but if its deficiencies or mistakes 
were helped out by other information given to the proper 
officers, or by other knowledge on their [the city's] part, no 
matter how acquired, then it would turn the statute into 
a mere trap for the ignorant and unskillful, to deprive them 
of a right of action because of failing to do something which 
caused the municipality no injury and put it to no disad-
vantage. ' 
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"In addition, the case clearly falls within prOVISIOns of 
the second rule above stated, to wit, that, where the munici-
pality has, as in the present case, received a defective claim, 
made full investigation of the accident, and then rejected 
it for reasons other than a defect in the form of notice or its 
contents, the city is estopped from relying upon a defect 
in the notice of claim to prevent recovery in an action sub-
sequently brought. (See numerous cases above cited.) 
"For the foregoing reasons in my opinion the judgment 
of the trial court should be reversed." 
In addition to the cases cited in Mr. Justice McComb's dis-
senting opinion, see: Barton v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 
331 [194 Pac. 961]; Cawthon v. City of Houston, (Tex. 
Com. App.) 231 S. W. 701; Draper v. Village of Springwells, 
235 Mich. 168 [209 N. W. 150] ; Naze v. Town of Hudson, 250 
Mass. 368 [145 N. E. 468]. 
It has been repeatedly declared by the courts of this state 
that the purpose, aim and object of the claim statute here 
involved is twofold, namely, to enable the city to investigate 
the accident and conditions causing it, and to compromise 
or pay the claim if it deems it expedient, thus avoiding the 
expense of litigation. No other purposes have ever been 
mentioned. In the instant case the purposes of the statute 
have been wholly satisfied and fulfilled. There can be and 
is no dispute on that subject. The city made a complete 
and thorough investigation of the accident and gave con-
sideration to the claim and rejected it. There is not a ves-
tige of any detriment or disadvantage having been suffered 
by the city. There is not a single act or thing the city could 
or would have done had the claim been more complete. On 
the other hand, the plaintiff under the majority opinion suf-
fers great and irreparable damage. She is absolutely fore-
closed from having a determination of her case On the merits. 
What purpose or reason can be given to sustain the con-
clusion reached in the majority opinion? I submit that there 
is nothing but the most specious argument based upon a 
fine-spun technicality. It has always been my opinion that 
all the law whether enacted by the Legislature, or as inter-
preted by the courts, is based upon reasonableness and jus-
tice. Indeed, that principle has been declared by the courts 
in a legion of cases. One of the ramifications of that prin-
ciple is that form and technicality shall not render the courts 
Dec. 1941.] HALL V. CITY OF Los ANGELES. 
[19 c. (2d) 198] 
207 
impotent to rectify wrongs even when it is necessary to look 
through a maze of technicalities to protect substantive rights. 
As I have stated, there is a substantial compliance with 
the statute in this case and the city is estopped from assert-
ing that the claim is defective. This is not conferring a 
power upon the city which it does not possess, or making 
lawful ultra vires acts. The city has the power and the 
duty to pay just claims for injuries due to dangerous or 
defective condition of its property. It has the power and 
duty to pass upon such claims. It inescapably follows that 
it has the power, inherent and implicit in those general 
powers, to pass directly or indirectly, upon the sufficiency 
of those claims. { True, the statute states that the filing of 
a claim is a condition precedent to the city's liability, but 
even if it be said that when no claim has been filed the city 
has no power to admit liability and pay damages for the 
injury suffered, yet there is a vast difference between no 
claim and a defective claim. If a claim has been filed, that 
condition prerequisite· to liability has been satisfied, the dor-
mant power of the city to act has been activated and brought 
into existence. Henceforward, it has power to determine the 
sufficiency of that claim. That determination may be evi-
denced by express action by the city on that specific subject, 
or by conduct of the city or its officials which constitutes 
an implied finding or determination that the claim is in proper 
form. Such implied determination may arise from the appli-
cation of the doctrines of either waiver or estoppel. An 
analogous situation might be imagined in the instance of 
a court which has general jurisdiction or power to adjudicate 
tort actions. If no complaint is filed, it has no power on 
its own initiative to grant or refuse recovery to the injured 
person. But once a complaint has been filed its general 
power enables it to pass upon the sufficiency of that claim 
for relief. Merely because the claim was defective in that 
it lacked some indispensable element would not mean that 
the court was ousted from jurisdiction, or deprived of its 
power to pass upon the sufficiency of the claim. 
In the case at bar it is conceded that plaintiff filed a claim 
with the proper official of the city of Los Angeles within 
sixty days after she received the injury complained of. This 
claim was fully investigated by the city and rejected upon 
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the advice of the city attorney. The notice of rejection of 
said claim is as follows: 
"Greetings: At the meeting of the Council held this day, 
the following report of the Finance Committee, was adopted: 
'In the matter of the claim of J\1ary E. Hall, in the amount 
of $8,000.00, for damages because of personal injuries al-
leged to have been received when she slipped on a muddy 
sidewalk at the Gorner of Union D1"ive and Sixth Street, on 
September 14, 1938: The City Attorney reports that after 
making a complete investigation of this matter, he is of the 
opinion that there is no municipal liability involved, and 
recommends that the claim he denied. We recommend, in 
view of the City Attorney's report, that said claim be denied 
and the matter filed '." 
It will be observed from the foregoing notice of rejection 
that the place where the accident occurred was known to the 
city officials and t'hat the claim was rejected upon the advice 
of the city attorney' "that there is no municipal liability 
involved. " The form or substance of the claim was not 
questioned by the city officials until after this action was 
commenced. 
To 'hold, under the circumstances of this case, that ,plain-
tiff is denied recovery because she failed to file a sufficient 
claim is, in my opinion; substituting form for substance and 
technicality for common sense. Such result was obviously 
never intended by the framers of the statutory provision here 
involved. 
In my opinion the judgment should he reversed. 
Houser, J., concurred in the foregoing conclusion. 
Dec. 1941.] BASTAJIAN V. BROWN. 209 
fL. A. No. 16671. In Bank. Dec. 19, 1941.] 
S. B. BASTAJIAN, as Administrator With the Will An-
nexed, etc., Appellant, v. JAMES E. BROWN et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Judgments-Change-Judicial Errors: Opening and Vacating 
-Grounds for Relief-Judicial Error-Judgments Inadver-
tently Made.-Independently of a statute, a trial court has 
power to correct mistakes and to annul orders and judgments 
inadvertently or improvidently made. While a court has 
power to vacate judgments and orders inadvertently made 
which are not actually the result of the exercise of judgment, 
it has no power, having once made its decision after regular 
submission, to set aside or amend judicial errors except under 
appropriate statutory proceedings. 
[2] Id.-Opening and Vacating - Procedure - Review - Judge's 
Declaration.-In passing on the question as to whether the 
entry of findings and judgment was judicial error which 
could not be corrected more than one year after the entry 
thereof, the reviewing court cannot wholly disregard or 
lightly brush aside the declaration of the trial judge and 
finding in the order vacating the judgment that the findings 
and judgment did not conform to the true judgment rendered. 
[3] Id.-Opening and Vacating-Procedure - Evidence-Judge's 
Recollection.-In vacating or correcting a clerical error or 
mistake, the trial judge may give effect to his own recollection 
[4] Id.-Opening and Vacating-Errors - Clerical Errors-Pro-
cedure - Evidence - Minute Entry.-While a· minute entry 
made shortly after trial in which the judgment is ordered for 
a defendant is not the decision or judgment of the court and 
the opinion thereby expressed is not binding upon it, yet it 
is evidence of the intent of the court as to the decision, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law he intended ultimately 
to make. It may be inferred from such an entry that his 
intent was the same when he in fact did sign findings, and 
where those findings were contrary to the intention so ex-
pressed, the signing thereof was clerical error. 
[1] See 14 Cal Jur. 1019; 31 Am. Jur. 279. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, §§ 130, 133, 164 (3), 
165; [2] Judgments, § 226; [3] Judgments, § 217 (2); [4] Judg-
ments, §§ 164, 217 (2); [5] Judgments,§ 164 (3); [6] Appeala,nd 
Error, § 1298. 
